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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
This matter comes on before this court on appeal and 
cross-appeal from the final judgment entered in the district 
court in this case on January 7, 1998. The case arose from 
the most commonplace of events, an intersection 
automobile accident on September 4, 1985. Nevertheless, 
the litigation which has ensued in the aftermath of the 
accident for more than 12 years has been truly 
extraordinary. While it would be desirable somehow to 
bring this litigation to an end, we are constrained to reverse 
in part and to require further proceedings. On certain 
issues, however, we will affirm and, as we explain, we do 
not reach other issues. 
 
The following historical and procedural events have taken 
the case to its present posture. The plaintiffs, Joel M. 
Seibert and Stacey J. Seibert, are husband and wife and at 
all material times have been citizens of New York State. On 
September 4, 1985, Joel M. Seibert, who, as a matter of 
convenience we singularly shall call Seibert, was operating 
a motor vehicle in Burlington County, New Jersey, owned 
by his employer, Caldor Inc., when he was involved in an 
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accident at a controlled intersection with a vehicle owned 
and operated by Ruth Sexton, a New Jersey citizen. Seibert 
was injured in the accident. Sexton's vehicle was insured 
by CIGNA Insurance Company in a policy with $50,000 
liability limit. National Union Fire Insurance Company 
insured the Caldor vehicle in a policy which included 
underinsured motorist coverage. 
 
Seibert individually had an automobile liability policy 
issued in New York on his own vehicle by Travelers 
Insurance Company which also included underinsured 
motorist coverage. The Travelers policy provided that the 
underinsured motorist coverage would not apply if Seibert 
"shall, without written consent of [Travelers], make any 
settlement with or prosecute to judgment any action 
against any person or organization who may be legally 
liable therefor." 
 
Seibert engaged the New Jersey law firm of Nusbaum, 
Stein, Goldstein, and Bronstein and, in particular, Lewis 
Stein of that firm, to seek damages for his injuries. We refer 
to the firm and Stein individually simply as Stein. Stein 
then, on September 3, 1986, brought a diversity action in 
the District of New Jersey against Sexton but by December 
1987 Stein settled the case on behalf of Seibert with CIGNA 
for the $50,000 policy limits. With that settlement, Seibert's 
district court action against Sexton was dismissed and 
thus, as far as we can ascertain, Sexton has had no further 
involvement in this matter. 
 
Thereafter Stein, on behalf of Seibert, demanded that 
Travelers pay the $250,000 underinsured motorist coverage 
to Seibert. Travelers, however, rejected the demand by a 
letter of September 1, 1988, addressed to Stein, on the sole 
ground that Seibert had settled the Sexton claim without 
its consent. On September 14, 1989, Stein brought an 
action in the district court in New Jersey on behalf of 
Seibert against Travelers seeking to establish that it was 
responsible for the underinsured motorist coverage. 
Travelers filed an answer admitting that it had issued a 
policy insuring Seibert but disclaiming any knowledge of 
the remaining allegations in Seibert's complaint. In 
addition, Travelers set forth eight separate defenses of a 
general nature which, except for a defense that it reserved 
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its right to seek to apply New York law, seem not 
particularly addressed to the circumstances of Seibert's 
complaint. 
 
Thereafter, Travelers moved for summary judgment on 
the ground that Seibert had settled the Sexton action 
without its consent. The district court in that action, 
Seibert v. Travelers, Civ. No. 89-3966 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 1991), 
by opinion dated January 8, 1991, granted Travelers' 
motion. While the court recognized that consent to settle 
clauses are against New Jersey public policy, see Longworth 
v. Van Houten, 538 A.2d 414 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1988), the court held that New York law was controlling on 
the basis of New Jersey choice of law principles which it 
applied in that diversity of citizenship case. See Shuder v. 
McDonald's Corp., 859 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1988). The 
court found that the consent to settle clause did not violate 
New York law as that state recognizes the use of such 
clauses to facilitate the subrogation rights of the insurance 
company. On appeal, we affirmed by judgment order on 
October 23, 1991. Seibert v. Travelers Indem. Co., 947 F.2d 
936 (3d Cir. 1991). Upon our affirming the district court's 
summary judgment, any possibility that Seibert could 
recover from Travelers was gone. 
 
Between the time of the district court's order granting 
summary judgment in the Travelers action and our 
judgment order affirming the summary judgment, Stein, on 
behalf of Seibert, instituted the third case arising out of the 
accident, i.e., Seibert v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., MRS-L- 
4298-91, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 
Division, Morris County. In that action, Seibert sought, 
inter alia, to recover under the underinsured motorist 
coverage provisions of the National Union policy. 
Subsequently, other counsel was substituted for Stein and 
ultimately the National Union action was dismissed when 
National Union agreed to arbitrate Seibert's claim. The case 
eventually was settled for $140,000 which National Union 
paid on its underinsured motorist coverage. 
 
While the National Union action was pending, Seibert 
started this New Jersey district court action, the fourth 
case arising from the accident, against Stein. It is this case 
which now is on appeal before us. While there were 
 
                                4 
  
numerous allegations in the complaint, its principal theory 
is that Stein wrongfully settled the Sexton action without 
Travelers' consent, thus forfeiting Travelers' underinsured 
motorist coverage. 
 
Following protracted proceedings in the district court, the 
parties filed cross motions for summary judgment which 
resulted in the district court issuing opinions on August 20, 
1997, and December 31, 1997, which we describe in some 
detail. In its initial opinion, the district court set forth the 
background of the case and then pointed out that this 
action was for legal malpractice. The court recognized that 
a legal malpractice case could require a "trial within a 
trial," but that the matter was before the court on motions 
for summary judgment. The court indicated that Stein 
sought summary judgment on the alternative theories that 
(1) he did not deviate from accepted standards of legal 
practice; and (2) even if he did, Seibert suffered no damages 
so Stein could not be liable. On the other hand, Seibert 
sought a summary judgment that Stein was liable for legal 
malpractice. 
 
The district court indicated that in New Jersey a plaintiff 
in a legal malpractice action must demonstrate: (1) the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship creating a duty 
of care upon the attorney; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) 
proximate causation of damages. See Lovett v. Estate of 
Lovett, 593 A.2d 382, 386 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991). 
The court said that Seibert based his claim on the district 
court's opinion in the Travelers action because Stein's 
"failure to notify Travelers under the consent to settle 
provision of its policy [fell] far below the minimal standard 
and duty of care which [Stein] owed to [Seibert]." The court 
then indicated that Stein's "default was the proximate 
cause of Travelers' successful refusal to pay any part of the 
potentially available underinsured coverage." Thus, to that 
extent, it granted Seibert's motion for summary judgment. 
 
The court indicated, however, that it had not been 
established in Seibert's action against Travelers that he in 
fact would have recovered on the Travelers policy. All that 
was established was that Travelers had a defense to 
Seibert's claim. 
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The court then indicated that while the declarations page 
of Seibert's policy with Travelers listed certain 
endorsements, i.e., 33122 and 33150, as being part of the 
policy, "it is unclear whether these endorsements, either in 
whole or in part, were ever physically attached to the policy 
or otherwise specifically brought to Mr. Seibert's attention." 
The significance of endorsement 33122 is that it limited 
underinsured motorist coverage to accidents which occur in 
the State of New York. In any event, the court held that 
New York Insurance Law S 3420(f)(2) requires that 
underinsured motorist coverage in New York apply "in any 
state or Canadian province." Consequently, the court 
believed that the limitation in endorsement 33122 to New 
York accidents was ineffective. Thus, the court held that 
the $250,000 underinsured motorist coverage was available 
to Seibert who, because of "Stein's malpractice in failing to 
seek Travelers' consent to settle the Sexton suit" was denied 
access to the funds. The court then indicated that the 
parties recognized that the reasonable settlement value of 
Seibert's claim far exceeded $50,000. Thus, Stein's 
malpractice injured Seibert. 
 
The court recognized that Stein argued "that the only 
right which [Seibert] lost because Travelers effectively 
denied coverage . . . was the right to arbitrate any claim or 
dispute against that company." The court, however, 
indicated that "it is by no means certain that Travelers 
would have pushed Mr. Seibert to arbitration had [Stein] 
sought Travelers' consent-to-settle in a timely fashion." 
Indeed, the court thought that it was "unlikely" that 
Travelers would have contended that the underinsured 
motorist coverage was not applicable to the New Jersey 
accident and that, in any event it was applicable, and 
arbitration would not have produced a different result. 
 
In its December 31, 1997 opinion, the court considered 
damages. The court pointed out that in the National Union 
case Seibert recovered $140,000 in a settlement. 1 The court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The National Union action also was against Caldor. Although the 
district court referred to the case as the Caldor action, we understand 
that National Union actually paid the settlement. For our purposes, it 
does not matter whether Caldor or National Union paid the $140,000. 
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recognized that while Seibert might have recovered more or 
less from Travelers, "the $140,000 settlement sum is a 
reasonable and just figure to use as a base for calculations 
of interest due from [Stein] to [Seibert]." This base figure 
was important inasmuch as the court intended to fix 
damages on an interest theory to compensate Seibert for 
the loss of the use of the money because of the delay in 
making the settlement as the coverage sought from 
Travelers had been lost. Ultimately, the court found that 
damages would be calculated on the basis of prejudgment 
interest for nine years. The court also awarded damages on 
the basis of Seibert's attorney's fees and costs in this 
action. The court, however, refused to award punitive 
damages against Stein, to allow Seibert to amend his 
complaint to seek such damages, or to require Stein to 
disgorge the fees he collected from negotiating the Sexton 
settlement. The parties then filed this appeal and cross- 
appeal. 
 
On this appeal, Stein raises three points. First, he 
contends that the Travelers policy would not have given 
Seibert coverage in this action even if Stein complied with 
the consent to settle clause. Second, he contends that even 
if the Travelers policy provided for underinsured motorist 
coverage, the court erred in granting summary judgment to 
Seibert because he made a full recovery from National 
Union and there is no proof that he would have recovered 
on the Travelers policy. Third, he contends that there was 
no basis for damages for the loss of use of money by reason 
of delay in recovering from National Union instead of 
Travelers, and for counsel and expert fees. As far as we can 
ascertain, however, Stein does not contend that he was not 
negligent in settling the claim against Sexton without 
complying with the consent to settle clause, although he 
does contend that without damage (and he contends there 
was none) he cannot be liable for malpractice. 
 
Seibert cross-appeals with respect to damages. He 
contends that the district court should have fixed a higher 
rate of interest, allowed him to amend his pleadings to 
claim punitive damages, and compelled Stein to disgorge 
his fees from the Sexton action. 
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In view of the circumstance that the district court 
decided this case on cross motions for summary judgment, 
we are exercising plenary review on this appeal. Petruzzi's 
IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 
1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1993). We can affirm only if we 
conclude that the pleadings, depositions, answer to 
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, show that the party who obtained summary 
judgment on a point was entitled to that judgment as a 
matter of law and that there was no genuine dispute of 
material fact standing in his way. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
 
At the outset of our discussion, we must acknowledge 
that the district court had a most difficult task. Moreover, 
it is evident that the court was striving to reach a just and 
equitable result and, indeed, may have done so. That said, 
we are convinced that the court engaged in fact finding 
inappropriate in the procedural posture of the case and 
thus in large part we must reverse. 
 
To start with, the court surely erred when it predicated 
its disposition on the theory that Seibert would have 
recovered $140,000 from Travelers if Stein had not erred 
with respect to the consent to settle clause. While we do not 
doubt that the $140,000 figure could have been a 
reasonable settlement of a claim against Travelers, neither 
we nor the district court can usurp the fact finding function 
of the jury and find that Seibert could have recovered that 
sum from Travelers. In fact, for all we know, Travelers 
would not have settled and ultimately would have prevailed 
at arbitration on the theory that Sexton was not liable. 
Moreover, contrary to the district court, we are not 
confident that if Travelers had taken the position that as a 
matter of law its coverage was inapplicable had it not 
prevailed on the consent to settle clause (a possibility on 
which we only can speculate), it would not have been 
successful. In this regard, we point out that the court 
indicated that it was unclear whether the disputed 
endorsements were attached to Seibert's policy. Such a 
situation hardly is a springboard to a summary judgment 
order. 
 
The situation before us involves reviewing a judgment 
predicated on facts which we cannot know at this time. For 
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example, how can anyone know on the basis of the record 
before us what position Travelers would have taken on the 
legal issues if it had not prevailed originally on its summary 
judgment motion? We only know for sure that Travelers did 
not raise some of the issues in the litigation against it that 
Stein raises on this appeal. But, as Stein pointed out at 
oral argument, how do we know what Travelers would have 
done had it lost its motion for summary judgment? 
 
Perhaps, as Stein suggested, it would have raised other 
defenses. On the other hand, it might have agreed to 
arbitrate, as did National Union, and at arbitration only 
argued that Sexton was not liable on negligence principles. 
In that event, Stein's argument that Travelers did not 
provide applicable underinsured motorist coverage would 
be irrelevant. Yet Travelers might have prevailed on the 
theory that Sexton was not liable. In the circumstances, we 
have concluded that, except to the extent that the orders of 
August 20, 1997, and December 31, 1997, are predicated 
on a finding that Stein committed malpractice by settling 
the Sexton action without notice to Travelers, those orders, 
insofar as they impose liability on Stein, must be reversed 
as must the judgment of January 7, 1998. 
 
We make three further points with respect to Stein's 
appeal. First, we reject Seibert's contentions that Stein is 
barred by estoppel and waiver principles by reason of 
having brought the action against Travelers from 
contending that Travelers' policy did not afford Seibert 
underinsured motorist coverage. Naturally, a plaintiff's 
attorney in filing an action takes the position that the 
action is justified. If the attorney through some error 
precludes the case from being litigated on the merits, then 
the concept of a trial within a trial is not consistent with 
estopping the attorney from contending that if he had not 
made an error in any event he could not have been 
successful. 
 
Second, we reject Seibert's contention that the district 
court in the Travelers action established that Seibert would 
have recovered from Travelers but for Stein's error. It is 
true that in the Travelers action the court said that because 
of Seibert's failure through Stein to comply with the 
consent to settle clause he is "not now entitled to the 
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underinsurance coverage [he] could have otherwise 
received." Yet clearly what it meant by this statement was 
that Seibert lost the possibility of recovering. After all, the 
court obviously did not consider the other insurance issues 
Stein advances nor did it consider Sexton's liability to 
Seibert. 
 
Third, we recognize that we might as a matter of law 
adjudicate at this time whether, as Stein contends, the 
Travelers policy did not provide underinsured motorist 
coverage to Seibert for the Sexton accident or, if it did, the 
Travelers coverage was, as Stein contends, excess to the 
National Union policy. We, however, resist the temptation to 
do so as that determination may rest on disputed facts and 
in any event it may appear conclusively on the remand that 
Travelers would not have made those contentions had it not 
prevailed on its summary judgment motion. Moreover, we 
simply cannot grant Stein summary judgment at this time 
on a theory that the Travelers policy did not afford 
coverage, because viewing the matter on the record most 
favorably to Seibert with respect to Stein's motion,"we 
cannot say that the evidence thus far submitted so clearly 
established [noncoverage] such that no reasonable juror 
could conclude otherwise." Albee Assocs. v. Orloff, 
Lowenbach, Stifelman, and Siegal, 1999 WL 6537, at *7 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 11, 1999). 
 
While we largely reverse on the appeal, we reach a 
different result on the cross-appeal. After a careful review of 
this case, we have concluded that Stein is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law with respect to Seibert's claim 
for punitive damages and for disgorgement of his fee for 
settling the Sexton case. A plaintiff cannot pursue a claim 
for punitive damages where, as here, no hint of such a 
claim was contained in the pleadings or the pretrial order. 
Furthermore, the undisputed facts of this case simply 
cannot support a punitive damages award. 
 
In view of the aforesaid, we will reverse the orders of 
August 22, 1997, and December 31, 1997, and the 
judgment of January 7, 1998, except to the extent that they 
establish that Stein was guilty of malpractice by settling the 
Sexton claim without Travelers' consent (which is not to say 
that he is liable for malpractice), and except to the extent 
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that Seibert's punitive damages and disgorgement claims 
have been foreclosed. The punitive damages and 
disgorgement claims are out of this case. In view of our 
disposition, we do not reach the damages issues raised on 
this appeal. The parties will bear their own costs on this 
appeal. 
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